Cage Match: Pound vs Blatter

Here's a shootout in the making: two guys who can't keep away from controversy, now getting all hot under the collar at each other.

Dick Pound, head of WADA, and Sepp Blatter, head of FIFA, are having a public dispute about anti-doping policy.

The dispute itself is actually a bit puzzling:

While FIFA has modified its statutes regarding doping and … signed a declaration of intent to fully sanction WADA's code, the sticking point remains WADA's insistence that a two-year ban must be imposed on first offenders. … Blatter said, "You have to take each case on its merits, starting with a warning, to a six months punishment right up to a life ban. You cannot start from a two-year ban."

Today, AFP is reporting that FIFA has dropped the explicit mention of a six-month ban, but still wants to judge each offense on its merits; Reuters thinks that WADA won't be so easily satisfied.

All of the press reports make reference to WADA's "mandatory" two-year ban. The first Reuters article mentions a case where an Italian swimmer named Giorgia Squizzato challenged a WADA-imposed two-year ban at the CAS, with CAS ruling in her favor that the two-year punishment didn't fit her crime.

A few of those facts are wrong, though. First, the WADA code does not insist on a two-year suspension for a first offense, and it does allow for some interpretation on a case-by-case basis. You can see the WADA Code (PDF) here. If an athlete commits a violation but bears "no fault or negligence," then sanctions can be dropped entirely. If an athlete commits a violation but bears "no significant fault or negligence" then suspensions can be reduced to as little as one year.

As for the Squizzato case, you can see the actual CAS decision (PDF) here. Squizzato tested positive for a low concentration of an anabolic agent called clostebol in August, 2004. She did not dispute the test results; she explained that she was using a topical cream to fight a skin infection, and that she was not aware that it contained a banned substance. The Italian federation suspended her on September 30; on December 9, FINA (not WADA) ruled that Squizzato should serve a one-year suspension, to begin on the date of the ruling. FINA ruled that Squizzato bore "no significant fault or negligence," going easy on her because she didn't gain any advantage from the substance, and also due to her relative lack of experience.

Squizzato appealed that decision to the CAS, asking that her suspension be overturned. The CAS panel denied that appeal. They ruled in her favour only in the sense that her suspension was ruled to be effective from September 30 instead of December 9.

So FINA followed the WADA code and handed out a one-year suspension, and the CAS upheld the decision. One of the things this demonstrates is that even under the WADA code, FIFA would have some leeway to hand out suspensions that are less than two years long. I guess that they want more freedom to set penalties than are afforded by the WADA code. In that sense, the Squizzato decision does offer a little support; to quote the panel,

the mere adoption of the WADA Code … by a respective Federation does not force the conclusion that there is no other possibility for greater or less reduction a sanction than allowed by [WADA]. The mere fact that regulations of a sport federation derive from the World Anti-Doping Code does not change the nature of these rules. They are still – like before – regulations of an association which cannot (directly or indirectly) replace fundamental and general legal principles like the doctrine of proportionality a priori for every thinkable case.

At any rate, Pound has been making some aggressive comments in the media, which is nothing new, but he may have met his match this time. Not too many people have the leverage to stand up to Dick Pound, since failure to bow to WADA could result in expulsion from the Olympic Games. FIFA, though, doesn't really need the Olympics as much as the IOC needs FIFA. It will be interesting to watch this develop.

Saying Nothing

IOC president Jacques Rogge is a master of speaking while saying nothing. And yet, the press seems to be pretty quick to jump to an unstated conclusion. Here's an SI.com story headlined A second chance? IOC may take another look at softball for 2012 Games. That sounds exciting — I guess they're thinking about revisiting the decision to exclude softball from the Olympic program. Well, not quite. The story reports on an interview Rogge gave to Around the Rings. Here's what Rogge said:

Rogge told Around the Rings that IOC statutes prohibit the Olympic committee's executive board from overturning "a sovereign decision by the IOC session. Our charter is very clear that the [executive board] cannot take an initiative to say 'we want a new vote' because that would open up the door to all kinds of re-votes." But he said there were precedents for the full IOC to reconsider a decision.

So Rogge didn't say anything that SI.com shouldn't have already known, but I guess it's an excuse for a story. It kind of reminds me of this. The man is a genius at getting people to hear what they want him to say.

For what it's worth, I suspect that softball does have a pretty good chance of being on the program for 2012, in the end, but that hasn't changed since this interview came out.

I wish I was an Around the Rings subscriber, though, because the teaser for the Rogge interview is intriguing: "The president of the IOC says rules governing additions to the sports program should be eased." As I predicted at the time of the cuts, Rogge never intended for the Olympic program to be decreased in size, and he wants replacements for baseball and softball.

EPO Tests Problematic

The New York Times (registration required) has an interesting article about the new test for EPO in urine samples, which is not a straightforward chemical detection and requires considerable interpretation by a skilled practitioner:

To distinguish recombinant EPO from the natural substance, the scientists used a technique that did not rely heavily on more straightforward chemical tests. To test for EPO, a preparation of urine is placed on the edge of a blotter, then subjected to the pull of an electrical field, leaving deposits in certain patterns that resemble a tiger's stripes. Some bands are more associated with recombinant EPO, some more with the natural substance. But there is considerable overlap as well. Scientists assess the patterns and the intensity of the bands. "There is a fair amount of cross-reactivity with the test, so there are certainly false positives," [Australian research scientist Nicolle] Packer ... said. "There is a lot of argument - and a lot of politics - about whether the test is good."

It should go without saying that if a positive test is going to be used to interrupt or terminate an athlete's career, invalidate past results, and ruin reputations, then the probability of false alarm (false positive rate) has to be very, very low. It doesn't sound to me like the EPO test meets that standard yet.

The story is inspired by the newest Lance Armstrong allegations, but it has broad applicability since EPO abuse for sports doping is thought to be very widespread. I found the article via Transition Game. You might also be interested in Nick's post, which is titled Dick Pound Must Go.

On Doping Rates and Sample Size

Are you ready for more fun with the IOC Programme Commission Report? In case you've forgotten, that's the document that the IOC produced this spring evaluating each of the 28 summer Olympic sports, plus five other recognized sports (Roller Sports, Golf, Rugby, Squash, and Karate), prior to the big programme review and sport elimination vote.

Of course the actual vote had almost nothing to do with the evaluation report, but it has a lot of interesting information in it, anyway. As I previously noted, one of the evaluation criteria is an assessment of each sport's anti-doping effort. At the back of the report is a table that documents the number of tests performed, and the number of confirmed positive tests, for each of the 33 IFs.

Here's a little trivia question for you: out of the 28 summer Olympic sports, plus the five recognized sports, which one had the highest rate of positive tests?

The answer would have to be athletics, right? Athletics reported that 0.64% of tests in 2003 showed doping violations, which is pretty high, but that wasn't the highest reported rate. It wasn't weightlifting (0.50%), cycling (0.49%), or aquatics (0.20%), either.

The winner was Golf, with an astonishing 1.67%. And as far as I can tell, the IF in question (the IGF) has no jurisdiction over the professional golf tours, so these would have been largely amateurs. Actually, three of the proposed sports (Golf, Karate, and Roller Sports) finished in the top 5, and Rugby was 8th. Athletics was 6th, and the third-highest among current Olympic sports. The highest among Olympic sports (and second overall) was Baseball, at 1.24%, followed by Archery, at 0.88%. These are all fairly surprising results, in my opinion. I was even somewhat caught off guard by the high rate in baseball; remember, these are tests administered by the IBAF, which has no jurisdiction over major league baseball and its steroid problems.

So what's behind these surprising results? Is drug use really rampant in amateur golf, at two and half times the rate of athletics?

Well, maybe. But I suspect that there's a more mundane reason for the odd results: small sample size. Whenever you sample a population (athletes) to calculate a rate of incidence (rate of doping), you're in fact making an estimate of the actual rate of incidence. That estimate comes from an underlying probability distribution, which implies a confidence interval associated with the estimate. If we want to convert the measured number of positive tests into a doping rate, we should also note the uncertainty in our estimate. The IOC table gives the percentage of positive tests, which is a legitimate estimate of the rate of doping in a sport; however, it does not address the issue of uncertainty.

In this case, we can estimate the uncertainty in the estimates of the doping rate by making some simplifying assumptions. Let's assume that the actual rate of doping in a given sport is p, and let's further assume that the tests are absolutely perfect — they catch every cheater, and never give any false alarms. (I'll discuss this second assumption a bit more later.)

If we test M athletes from the population, we would expect to find k = λ ≡ pM positive tests. In fact, of course, even with a perfect test we would not find exactly λ positives every time, due to the random nature of the sample; there is a non-zero probability that we would find k = λ ± 1, λ ± 2, etc. The probability distribution for k is described by the binomial distribution, which is nicely described in this Wikipedia article. We could use the binomial distribution directly to estimate the uncertainty in our estimate, but I'm going to make a few more simplifications until we get to the point where I can do the calculation on the back of the proverbial envelope.

It turns out that if positive tests are "rare," which they are, then the binomial distribution will approach the Poisson distribution (Wikipedia again). The Poisson distribution has the nice property that the mean and the variance are both equal to λ. The variance gives us a measure of the width of the distribution, or in other words, the uncertainty in our sampled estimate.

Now we can make one further simplification. If the the number of samples M is "large," then the Poisson distribution for k is well-approximated by a normal distribution, retaining the mean value (λ) and the variance (also λ). It turns out that in some of our cases the number of samples is not really large enough to completely justify this assumption, but let's go with it — this is rough work anyway. Now we really can work on the back of the envelope — we can say that the "one-sigma" uncertainty on the doping rate is equal to the square root of the number of positive tests, divided by the number of tests.

Figure 1

Figure 1 — 2003 positive doping test rates by sport (click to enlarge).

So for Golf (4 positive tests out of 240), the estimated doping rate is (1.67 ± 0.83)%, whereas for Athletics (120 positive tests out of 18,876), the estimated doping rate would be (0.64 ± 0.06)%;. Here the ± covers the one-sigma uncertainty, which is a roughly 68% confidence interval; to get a 95% confidence interval we could just double the uncertainty.

Figure 1 (inset) shows the estimated doping rates for 2003, including uncertainty, for 32 of the 33 sports (FIFA, which governs Olympic soccer, reported the largest number of tests (20,104) but did not reveal the number of violations). As you can see, the non-Olympic sports generally did not perform a large number of tests, and so their doping rate estimates are very uncertain. Other sports with high but uncertain positive test rates are Baseball, Archery, and Table Tennis. In fact, all of the truly susprising results have relatively large error bars, which tends to support the idea that the results are more due to random chance than any underlying truth.

Speaking of truth, of course we can't translate the positive test rate into a real doping rate unless we believe in the tests themselves. If the tests have a high probability of detection (near 100%), and a low probability of false alarm (near zero), then these numbers are realistic estimates of the incidence of doping among high-performance athletes. Otherwise, false positives and missed detections muddy the picture considerably. Some people will see this graph as evidence that overall doping rates are extremely low; others will conclude that the tests don't work. I've made a few arguments on this topic before, but I know I won't convince everybody, and I don't think we're ever going to know the objective truth.

Oh No! They've Cut (men's) Softball!

As noted here earlier, the USOC is attempting to lobby for softball's reinstatement to the 2012 summer Olympics. As part of that effort, a USOC delegation went down to the recent PASO (Pan American Sports Organization) meetings, to lobby IOC members to support their crusade.

If you read the sports news, you might think that things went very, very badly. The AFP (via Yahoo! News) is reporting that PASO, which governs the quadrennial Pan American Games, decided to drop softball from its programme as well. An independent story repeats this statement at SLAM! Sports.

More Pan Am Cuts

Inline (roller) hockey and racquetball have also been dropped from the Pan Am Games for 2007, and a number of non-Olympic events have been added. The Yahoo! News article states that slalom canoe/kayak was also dropped for 2007, but in fact it has never been part of the Pan Am Games.

Also, it's a technical point, but slalom canoe/kayak is not, in Olympic terms, a sport, but rather a discipline of canoe/kayak.

Something's been left out here, though. Softball Canada's web site is reporting very clearly that men's softball has been removed from the programme. The PASO press release announcing the addition of indoor football still lists softball on the programme, and the description of the sport on the Rio 2007 web site states:

Softball is more popular among women, who are the only players to take part in the Pan-american Games.

I'm forced to conclude that two independent news articles reported on the decision to drop softball from the Pan Am Games without making any distinction between men's softball (which has never been in the Olympics) and women's softball (which is apparently still part of the Pan Am Games). There are a few hints in the Slam! article, since it mentions that Canada has won every Pan Am gold medal since 1979. That's only true in men's softball, so perhaps the reader is supposed to guess that the article only applies to men's softball. But both articles link the PASO decision to the earlier IOC decision, which confuses the issue. Isn't it kind of critical to the story to note that women's softball has not been cut from the Pan Am Games? Pretty shoddy reporting, in my opinion.

Anyway, men's softball is definitely on the skids, having recently been dropped from even the Canada Games. (Incidentally, my local paper also reported that cut as if the whole sport had been removed, too, when in fact women's softball is still in the Canada Games. Anybody see a pattern here?) So things look pretty bleak for men's softball, which is OK with me. Really, softball and baseball are similar enough that it's a bit stupid having both in a multisport games. I would actually rather see women's baseball than softball, but the participation numbers don't warrant that switch, and not everybody shares my opinion. So be it.

However, I can actually see one glimmer of a possibility for the future of elite men's softball: get yourself on the Olympic programme. If women's softball can get themselves reinstated as a sport, then they've got their foot in the door. Once a sport is on the programme, they are sometimes able to add disciplines (like aquatics added synchro, gymnastics added trampoline, and cycling is adding BMX). For softball to add a men's discipline will require adding one medal and about 120 athletes to their quota. That won't be easy, but it doesn't require changes to the Olympic Charter, and doesn't require the approval of the IOC delegates at a general assembly. Furthermore, the removal of baseball has created exactly that much room under the cap.

I can imagine some of you asking yourselves: why would women's softball be interested in having men's softball added to the programme? I grant that some of the Olympic spotlight would be unfairly diverted from the women's game (as illustrated by the news stories I quoted above). I also grant that many male-dominated Olympic sports have made only token efforts to include a women's discipline. But this isn't just about doing men's softball a favour. If softball could pull this off — and I have no idea if they are even thinking about it — it would also help them stay on the Olympic programme, in my opinion. That's because it would, in the long term, broaden their base of international participation. Furthermore, including men's softball would serve to further distance the Olympic sport from baseball and its multitude of image problems.

Boxing, On The Ropes

The Associated Press reported last week that the IOC has withheld $9M in payments to the AIBA.

Normally, the IOC distributes millions of dollars (gathered largely from sponsorship revenue) to the Olympic sport IFs. For most sports, this is a major source of revenue — 62.7% for the AIBA. In this case, the IOC has decided to freeze payments "due to general judging issues that remain unresolved since the Athens Olympics," according to IOC spokesperson Giselle Davies. Although the results from Athens are not in question, "there was a general observation in Athens that things needed to be improved." IOC president Jacques Rogge signed a letter saying the funds will remain frozen until AIBA provides a clear timeline and planned actions.

The IOC Programme Commission report (PDF) had this to say about the judging situation:

Senior AIBA officials have had discussions with the IOC regarding possible changes to the judging system, open scoring and selection of referees and judges. To date (March 2005), the AIBA has not provided any concrete information on the possible changes or when they would be implemented.

Actually, the Programme Commission Report makes it pretty clear (in as neutral a tone as possible) that the AIBA is run by a bunch of idiots, so perhaps this isn't very surprising. Among other highlights:

The AIBA states that it has a four-year strategic planning process in place but there is no indication as to how the plan is prepared, how often and who is consulted.

Summary of the three main development programmes run by the AIBA between 2001 and 2004: No response given.

And here is the AIBA's own press release (PDF) covering one of the IOC-AIBA "discussions" on the judging issue, held in May of 2005:

AIBA strongly hopes that the selection [of referees and judges] for the next Olympics will be definitely better than in the past years.

I'm guessing that the IOC wants them to move beyond a "strong hope" and come up with an actual plan.

One Sport, One Vote

The vault has been opened! The envelope has been unsealed, and the IOC has released the sport vote totals from the programme review at their 117th session. Well, for one sport, anyway.

As I hoped, softball agreed to have their vote total released to all IOC members, so the IOC Executive agreed to let them have it. The result is astonishing. The sport was knocked out of the 2012 Olympics by a single vote. Actually, you might say by just half a vote; the result was 52-52, with one abstention.

The USOC and the International Softball Federation plan to work to have the decision revisited. Peter Ueberroth, Chairman of the USOC, claims that at least four IOC members were confused at the time of the vote, believing that they were voting against baseball. Now that's a well-informed voter!

I have been wanting to compare my detailed predictions with the actual vote totals. One result isn't much to go on, but maybe more will follow now that the cat is out of the bag. In the meantime, I have to admit that 52 votes is a lot more than I dreamed softball would get, although I did acknowledge that the method would underestimate team sport totals.

Things to Do in London

It looks like Denis Oswald is going to be spending a lot of time in London.

Oswald, an IOC member from Switzerland and president of the ASOIF, has been appointed chairman of the coordination commission for the 2012 summer Olympics and will oversee preparations for the IOC. He held the same position for the 2004 games in Athens.

Oswald was quoted as saying, "I am confident that London has all the ingredients for success — from a technically sound plan to widespread popular support." I am sure that the British will be gratified to hear that. Of course, the last time Oswald was in the news, he was quoted as saying this:

When it comes to rugby I'm not a specialist but people within the sport tell me that rugby sevens is something of a joke.

Fortunately, he won't have to worry about that conflict, since Rugby didn't get added to the Olympic programme after all.

Got Any Spare Change?

This story is, well, just priceless.

Canada, as many of you know, has a $1 coin and a $2 coin, the paper versions of these denominations having been phased out years ago. Both changes met with widespread resistance and denial, but eventually Canadians came to embrace the coins with some affection ("see, we really are different from Americans.") The folks at the Royal Canadian Mint have been hoping to convert Canada's $5 bills to coins for at least ten years now, but haven't found a way to lower public resistance. Apparently some marketing geniuses at the Mint had a brainstorm last winter — let's tell people that we'll give the money we save — maybe a few tens of millions each year — to Canada's Olympic athletes! That's got to be a winner, right?

The Finance Department of the federal government, always up for some found cash, decided to test the political waters frist. They hired Environics Research to conduct some focus groups last May. The results were unsurprising and yet profound:

Participants overwhelmingly rejected the very idea of a $5 coin and dismissed the Olympic-funding idea as ridiculous. "The proposal to direct these savings to the athletes was greeted with notable hostility," Environics said in a June 2005 report, obtained by The Canadian Press.

The CP article lifts the following quotes directly from the Environics report:

• "Absolutely ridiculous idea."
• "Give me a break! There are so many other burning issues where the money could be spent."
• "I'm embarrassed to be Canadian sometimes."
• "Do you freaking believe this?"

Notable hostility indeed! Even as an avid supporter of Canadian amateur sport, I had to laugh at just how badly the kids at the Mint misjudged public opinion on this one. They sure don't know much about Canadian culture:

And although people said government should support athletes, most thought any savings from a paper-to-coin conversion should go to health care, helping the homeless and social programs.

I don't think that you can get much more Canadian than that, and I mean that in both a good and a bad way. I can't argue with the needs expressed above, and it makes me feel strangely proud that the focus groups weren't calling for a $1-per-person tax cut. I could argue that throwing a few tens or even a few hundred million at health care or "social programs" is not going to make a noticeable difference to anybody's quality of life, and that it would be significant for Canada's Olympic athletes. But I guess that's not really the point. When push comes to shove, Canadians just don't believe that elite sport is all that important. And maybe that's a good thing, in the big picture; I can't even convince myself that doing better at the Olympics is more important than helping the homeless. But is it any wonder, with this attitude, that Canada struggles for every Olympic success?

King Of Athletes

I was on my way to writing a few not-very-enlightening comments about the decathlon at the World Athletics Championships, along the lines of "isn't it funny how slow they look running the 400 m, compared to the real runners? What's up with that?"

This reminded me of a famous quote (at least, it was once famous in my house), attributed to Steve Ovett, that the decathlon is nothing more than "nine Mickey Mouse events followed by a slow 1500." I was doing a Google search trying to find a definitive source, when I came upon a left-brain special extraordinaire. It's not out of my left brain, but I wish it was.

The piece is Challenge Decathlon: Barriers on the Way to Becoming the "King of Athletes," by Gunther Tidow. Tidow begins by quantifying the gaps between the world's best decathletes and the world's best single-eventers ("specialists"). There are a couple of nice graphs and some interesting conclusions. Here's an excerpt:

It is a general fact that the superiority of the specialists varies considerably from discipline to discipline. For decades, as far as velocity is concerned, decathletes have come closest to the specialist level in the long jump and in the (hurdles) sprint (93%), while in the throws and in the 1500m decathletes are farthest away from the specialists (ca. 75%) … The comparison between 1980 and 1996 shows … [that] the difference has become smaller in the throws, whereas it has become clearly bigger in the high jump as well as in the 1500m race.

Tidow goes on to attribute this change to improvements in doping control and changes in the decathlon scoring tables. Later on he also tries to explain, physiologically, why the 1500 is the most difficult event for the decathletes to excel in; he rephrases Ovett's quote above to note that "the decathlon consists of nine anaerobic speed-strength disciplines and a primarily aerobic endurance contest."

Progress Or Perish

Just a couple more items from the world athletics championships, and then I'll move on.

In case you missed it, the UK had a disappointing championships, winning three medals and reaching only six individual finals. (Also sucking: Canada, Germany, China, and Kenya.) UK Athletics performance director Dave Collins is looking for a solution, and this story in the Sun suggests one possibility:

What we want to achieve and what the public want are medals and final places at major games. And if athletes are flatlining in terms of progress, then maintaining them in that comfortable situation is unacceptable. Unless they recognise they need to work to reach targets and look to improve, why would I continue to fund them?

This raises an interesting and somewhat thorny issue. Mr. Collins is suggesting that an athlete's funding should be somehow linked to performance progression as opposed to performance per se.

Canadian Athlete Assistance Program (AAP) funding already has similar stipulations. It is possible, in theory, for the best Canadian in any given sport to be removed from the national team because his or her performance is not improving. In practice, however, these selection criteria are very difficult to apply. In effect, it comes down to a choice between athlete A, who is a proven performer, but probably on a downhill slide; and athlete B, who is not yet as good as athlete A, but still improving. It might make perfect economic sense to select athlete B in this circumstance, but it is a very difficult philosophical decision to make.

Strategic Failure

As long as I'm on the topic of the recent World Athletics Championships, I'll take the opportunity to rant on one of my pet fan peeves. Although there are always numerous examples to choose from, I'll focus on the men's 5,000 m, where Benjamin Limo of Kenya won the slowest final in World Championship history (results - PDF).

How slow was it, you ask? The winning time was 13:32.55. It goes without saying that this is ridiculously fast for a human being, but it's not quite as obvious that this is very slow for these athletes. Let's look at a few relevant benchmarks:

• World record: 12:37.35
• Limo's personal best: 12:54.99
• Limo's 2005 seasonal best: 12:58.66
• WC qualifying 'A' standard: 13:21.50
• WC qualifying 'B' standard: 13:28.00
• Last qualifier to WC final: 13:22.44
• Winner: 13:32.55

I should note that the world record holder, Kenenisa Bekele of Ethiopia, did not compete in Helsinki, choosing instead to concentrate on the 10,000 (which he won). Also, I'll point out that weather did not play a role; conditions were good for the final.

So how does this happen? How do you win a world championship final by running slower than you did in the semifinals, slower than the minimum world championship qualifying standard, and almost 5% slower than your own best time this year?

Well, the obvious answer is that you win by running slowly when everybody else runs slowly, too. In athletics this passes for "strategy." Of course, it doesn't matter that much to Benjamin Limo how he wins; obviously, this strategy worked for him.

So maybe a better question is, how does an elite athlete allow himself to lose a world championship final by running so slowly? After all, everybody in the final was capable of running at least 10 seconds faster than Limo did — they'd done it in the heats. The silver medalist, Sileshi Sihine of Ethiopia, had a personal best of 12:47.04 m/s, almost eight seconds faster than Limo's PB and more than forty-five seconds faster than the winning time. The fourth-place finisher, Eliud Kipchoge of Kenya, had a PB even faster than that! Wasn't it a monumental failure of strategy for these men to lose this race?

Ironically, it wasn't even Limo's decision to keep the pace slow, according to this quote from the new world champion:

It was not the kind of pace I needed. I like a race that is 2:40 (per kilometre) high speed. I was in front hoping to push the pace. I wanted someone to assist me. That’s why I had to go hard the last 400m. The World Championships can be anyone’s race. As we lined up for the start of the race I knew anybody can do it. Because you don’t know what kind of pace it is going to be and you don’t know how you are going to run.

Now I can see that "anybody can do it" is something that the fastest runners — like Limo, Sihine, and Kipchoge — would prefer to avoid. But if Limo wanted a faster pace, why didn't he just set it? It's not like 2:40 per kilometre (13:20 pace) would have killed him. He makes it sound like the pace is something that just happens. At any rate, as I said, it worked for him, so no complaints. Elsewhere Sihine was quoted as saying that the slow pace suited his strategy, which was "to wait until the final lap and up the speed." Why he chose that strategy is completely beyond me; given his proven prowess over 5,000 m, why would he want to turn it into a 400 m race?

I get even more puzzled when I see this happen in the heats or semifinals. After all, the last qualifiers are selected based on time, so doesn't it make sense to run the best time you can? And yet it doesn't seem to happen that way.

I'm sure that there are going to be people out there who think that I just don't get it, that I can't understand the strategic considerations that come into play at the highest levels of long-distance running. I think I do get it, actually. I understand that there's a disadvantage to front-running, and I also understand that for a few athletes keeping the pace slow really is their best chance of winning. But I'm always flabbergasted when the whole field decides to coast around for 90% of the race. I'm convinced that this is basically a failure of nerve by the race favourites. They are afraid that if they run as fast as they can they'll pull somebody else around with them and get mowed down in the last lap. But you know what? At least they would have done their best. Sihine and Kipchoge ran slowly and still got mowed down in the last lap. Is that really a less painful way to lose?

WR ≠ PB

An athletics quiz: when is a world record not a personal best?

The answer is: in the pole vault, very often.

At the recently-completed world athletic championships in Helsinki, Russian superstar Yelena Isinbayeva broke the world record in the women's pole vault, jumping 5.01 metres.

Breaking the world record is nothing new to Isinbayeva, of course. Here's a list (source) of her world-record outdoor vaults:

Table 1 — Yelena Isinbayeva's World Record Vaults (Outdoors)

Date	Record Vault	Previous Record
2003 JUL 07	4.82 m	4.81 m
2004 JUN 27	4.87 m	4.83 m
2004 JUL 25	4.89 m	4.88 m
2004 JUL 30	4.90 m	4.89 m
2004 AUG 24	4.91 m	4.90 m
2004 SEP 03	4.92 m	4.91 m
2005 JUL 05	4.93 m	4.92 m
2005 JUL 16	4.95 m	4.93 m
2005 JUL 22	5.00 m	4.95 m
2005 AUG 12	5.01 m	5.00 m

As you would expect from such a dominant performer, Isinbayeva also holds the indoor world record in the pole vault at 4.89 metres. She's been making the same kind of progress there (source):

Table 2 — Yelena Isinbayeva's World Record Vaults (Indoors)

Date	Record Vault	Previous Record
2004 FEB 15	4.83 m	4.81 m
2004 MAR 06	4.86 m	4.85 m
2005 FEB 12	4.87 m	4.86 m
2005 FEB 18	4.88 m	4.87 m
2005 FEB 26	4.89 m	4.88 m
2005 MAR 06	4.90 m	4.89 m

You don't have to be an expert to see that Isinbayeva is only toying with the world record. This past winter she broke the world indoor record four times in as many weekends, each time by exactly one centimetre. She's held the outdoor record for about a year, and has raised the record by 12 cm in eight very small steps. The only way you can break the world record with this kind of regularity is if you are still well below your maximum capacity.

So why would an athlete do that? Since she had already secured the world championship, why didn't Isinbayeva ask for the bar to be set at 5.15 in her final attempt in Helsinki, so that she could have a true test of her ability? The answer is very simple: breaking the world record is worth a lot of money for Yelena Isinbayeva.

In addition to $60,000 for winning the competition, Isinbayeva earned $100,000 from the IAAF and its sponsors for breaking the world record. This BBC story claims that Isinbayeva earns $100K every time she breaks the world record, presumably from Russia. I think that this claim is probably incorrect, but there is no doubt that the incentives are considerable. Many of the top European meets offer cash prizes in the tens of thousands of dollars for world records, to encourage the athletes to give their best efforts and to add to the excitement of the competition.

Olympic champion Tim Mack suggests that "she’s probably jumping 5.20 in practice." If that's a reasonable estimate, then she might have 19 more world outdoor records, and perhaps a similar number of indoor records, even if she doesn't improve at all. That adds up to a lot of money. It's no wonder she chooses to set each new record by the smallest possible margin.

The pole vault and the high jump are both susceptible to this kind of world record manipulation for a couple of reasons. Most importantly, the score is determined not by the height of the jump but by the height of the bar. This gives competitors extremely precise control of their results. Second, the competition proceeds by multiple attempts and a process of elimination. This means that a dominant performer can wait until all of his or her competitors are defeated before attempting the world record; there is then no danger that any other competitor will break the record, and therefore no reason to push it out of reach.

I don't mean to denigrate Isinbayeva in any way. She is clearly the best female pole vaulter the world has ever seen, and her accomplishments are unlikely to be matched any time soon. But I would like to see a world record that truly reflects her abilities, and we aren't seeing that right now.

One way to make the records more "honest" is to have tougher competition. The only reason Isinbayeva (and Sergei Bubka before her) can get away with this strategy is that she is head and shoulders above the rest of the field. If she had a real rival, then both of them would be forced to compete at their limits.

That's not really a solution that the IAAF can implement, though. Another idea would be to change the world record incentives for these events. For example, the incentive could scale according to the margin of the record-breaking attempt (e.g., pay ten times more for a ten-centimetre break than for a one-centimetre break). Another idea would be to offer the bonus only for certain milestones reached (5.10 m, 5.20 m, and so on).

CBC Radio Does Amateur Sport

Wednesday on CBC radio's Maritime Noon, the phone-in topic was "What's the best way to support amateur athletes?" You can access a RealAudio recording of the program here (August 3 - 53 minutes). There was a lot of discussion of grass-roots development and various provincial programs, which I don't talk a lot about here, and I found it interesting.

The guest list was quite impressive: Ken Bagnell, president of the Canadian Sport Centre Atlantic and member of the Canadian Sport Review Panel; Nicole Smith, the Executive Director of Sport New Brunswick; and 1998 Olympic bobsleigh gold medallist David 'Eli' MacEachern.

The panel worked well together; MacEachern provided the elite athlete's perspective, Smith concentrated on grass-roots and provincial programs, and Bagnell held court on the national sport system in Canada. Bagnell in particular, and not for the first time, showed himself to be very well-informed and articulate. He had all the facts at his fingertips and explained all of the issues clearly.

I was also struck by the high quality of input from callers; this was definitely not your usual weekday audience. Peter Stoffer, sitting MP and NDP critic for amateur sport, called in, as did Ed McHugh, president of Basketball Nova Scotia. Even a couple of old friends of mine called in.

I have to hand it to host Costas Halavrezos for a well-assembled show. I wonder, though, why he did not disclose that his daughter is on the Nova Scotia Canada Games team? If that created any bias on his part, it wasn't obvious to me, but I still found it curious that he didn't mention his own family's involvement in amateur sport.

Early Withdrawals … Fearing Penalties?

There's something funny going on at the 2005 world athletics championships. A lot of big stars are pulling out due to illness and injury.

The list of no-shows so far includes:

• Three-time world and Olympic javelin champion Jan Zelezny
• Olympic hammer champion Koji Murofushi.
• World 100m record holder Asafa Powell
• World 400m hurdles champion Jana Pittman
• Olympic 800m bronze medallist Jolanda Ceplak
• Double Olympic gold medallist Kelly Holmes
• Olympic 400m hurdles silver medallist Ionela Tirlea-Manolache
• Four-time world and defending Olympic 1500m champion Hicham El Guerrouj
• Olympic triple jump champion Christian Olsson
• World cross-country silver medallist Alice Timbilil
• World half-marathon bronze medallist Abdullah Ahmad Hassan
• World championship 1500m bronze medallist Hayley Tullett, Olympic fourth-place decathlete Dean Macey, triple jumper Phillips Idowu, and 400m hurdler Chris Rawlinson
• World top-ranked pole vaulter Paul Burgess and 1500m runner Sarah Jamieson
• POSTSCRIPT: Former world marathon champion Lidia Simon
• POSTSCRIPT: Olympic 20km walk bronze medallist Nathan Deakes CORRECTION: Deakes is still competing in the 50km walk.
• POSTSCRIPT: World and Olympic 400m hurdles champion Felix Sanchez, formerly reported as "50-50," will run

I don't know if this is an unusually large number of withdrawals, but it seems like it is. I am quite certain that some of the athletes on the list above are genuinely injured or sick. But I still wonder if some of this activity is a reaction to the very agressive anti-doping programme that will be conducted by the IAAF:

The 2005 edition of these World Championships … will see more than 850 tests conducted, … easily the largest testing programme ever conducted at an IAAF World Championships. … Approximately 350 competitors will be blood screened as they enter the athlete’s village, while during the championships themselves, close to 500 tests will be collected … Also in competition, about 100 blood tests will be carried out for the detection of Blood Transfusion, Hemoglobine Based Oxygen Carriers (Hbocs) and other substances.

The competition begins on Saturday.

Doping News: No Rules for the Relays?

Although I try to keep up with all the latest news from the fight against doping, I sometimes get a bit bored with it. I'm sure many of you do, too.

Then along comes a juicy story like this one to get me heated up nicely.

After a lengthy appeals process, the CAS has decided that the US 4 × 400m men's relay team can keep their 2000 Olympic gold medals. Well, five of them can. You can read the whole decision here (PDF); it's a complicated case, but I'll give you the summary.

In 1999, Jerome Young tested positive for nandrolone. The USATF exonerated him and did not report the offense to the USOC or the IAAF. The IAAF later discovered the infraction, and asked the CAS to overturn the USATF decision. The CAS ruled in favour of the IAAF, who subsequently suspended Young after the fact; his results from 1999 and 2000 were annulled.

In Sydney, Jerome Young ran in the preliminary rounds of the 4 × 400m relay, but not in the final. The IAAF stripped the US of their gold medal in that relay, ruling that the team had included an ineligible athlete (Young). The appeal of that decision was the subject of the latest ruling.

In their original decision (and in this appeal), the IAAF argued logically

that the natural consequence under the relevant IAAF Rules of the annulment of an individual’s results was the annulment of any relay result in which the athlete had competed. Every member of a winning relay team is awarded a gold medal whether they participate only in the preliminary rounds or in the final. This shows that a relay is one event composed of the preliminary rounds and a final. If an athlete is ineligible to compete as part of the team in a preliminary round, the team’s performance in the overall event must be affected.

The "relevant IAAF Rule" is IAAF Rule 59.4:

If an athlete is found to have committed a doping offence and this is confirmed after a hearing or the athlete waives his right to a hearing, he shall be declared ineligible. In addition, where testing was conducted in a competition, the athlete shall be disqualified from that competition and the result amended accordingly. His ineligibility shall begin from the date of suspension. Performances achieved from the date on which the sample was provided shall be annulled.

It seems pretty clear to me; Jerome Young was ineligible to run in Sydney, so his results were annulled. One of those results came in the semifinal of the relay, which means that the relay team used an ineligible athlete in qualifying for the final. Which means that the US relay team was not eligible to compete in the race that they won.

The CAS essentially let the US team off the hook on a technicality, deciding that there was no IAAF rule in place to cover this situation:

IAAF Rule 59.4 plainly deals with, and is plainly intended to deal only with, the situation of "an athlete" who is found to have committed a doping offence. It speaks to "the athlete" being disqualified and to the period of "his" ineligibility as well as to the annulment of his performances achieved as from the date on which his positive sample was provided. To take a rule that plainly concerns individual ineligibility and the annulment of individual results, and then to stretch and complement and construe it in order that it may be said to govern the results achieved by teams, is the sort of legal abracadabra that lawyers and partisans in the fight against doping in sport can love, but in which athletes should not be required to engage in order to understand the meaning of the rules to which they are subject.

This ruling can be extended to an absurd conclusion. Imagine that three of the members of the US relay team had tested positive for steroids on the spot at the 2000 games. (This is not that farfetched a scenario, actually; Alvin and Calvin Harrison are both currently serving two-year bans for doping infractions, while Young is serving a lifetime ban for a second offense.) Then by the logic of the CAS ruling, those three athletes could be stripped of their gold medals, but the team result would be allowed to stand! "Legal abracadabra," indeed.

One of the supporting points of "evidence" in the CAS argument is that the IAAF rules have recently been expanded to explicitly cover this kind of case. In the eyes of the CAS, this modification is equivalent to an admission that the case was not covered under the old rules. This is again ridiculous. Essentially, the CAS is arguing that the relay events were not covered by any rules about doping!

I do feel some sympathy for the innocent members of the US relay team (assuming that there are some); but certainly no more than I feel for the other competitors in the race. As the IAAF noted in its original decision to strip the gold medal,

The principle of fairness affected all athletes; not only those in the USA Team, but also those who competed in the team that finished 9th in the semi-finals and never made it to an Olympic Final and those who competed in the [Bahamas] team that finished 4th in the final and never obtained an Olympic medal.

This little piece of wisdom is not evident in the CAS ruling.

2014 Application Deadline Passes

Yesterday was the deadline for submission of bids to host the 2014 winter Olympic games.

Seven bids were received: Almaty, Kazakhstan; Borjomi, Georgia; Jaca, Spain; Pyeongchang, South Korea; Salzburg, Austria; Sochi, Russia, and Sofia, Bulgaria. None of these cities has ever hosted a winter Olympics. All except Borjomi have submitted unsuccessful bids before. Pyeongchang and Salzburg were finalists for 2010, with Vancouver ultimately edging out Pyeongchang in a very close vote.

The IOC may trim the list of seven to a short list of finalists in June 2006. I think, given this list, that you can count on it.

IOC Sport Vote Still Super-Duper Secret

The leaders of the International Softball Federation would like to know exactly how many votes they got when they were removed from the Olympic programme.

But they don't want to know so badly that they're willing to reveal the results to everybody else:

The International Olympic Committee agreed to release the sealed voting figures to the U.S.-based federation, but the softball body declined because the totals would have been given to all IOC members. (AP via The State)

So for now, still super-duper-secret; but I now have some hope that these voting results might some day be released. Stay tuned.

On the Olympics and Terrorism

Following indignant words from the paladins of the Olympic movement, after a little mournful Beethoven, the Games of Munich went on. It's an article of faith that The Games Must Go On. For the 30 years since, the Olympics — indeed, all sports events of any great scale — have carried on, even if permanently altered by the awareness that terrorists could again strike.
— Alexander Wolff, "When the Terror Began," Time, 2002.

Let me tell you a personal story.

In 1996, I competed at the summer Olympics in Atlanta. In the wee hours of Saturday, July 27, about halfway through those games, a bomb exploded in Centennial Olympic Park, killing one person and injuring more than one hundred others.

I'm happy to report that my own part in this story was not all that exciting, since my brother and I were a safe distance away, and my sister, my parents, and my fiancée had not yet arrived in Atlanta. Of course, the Games went on. Nevertheless, it did have a sobering effect on what was otherwise one of the greatest experiences of my life. I had friends on the Canadian Olympic team who were not such a safe distance away. My family did go to Olympic Park during their visit, and I did eventually go to Atlanta, and the shadow of that bombing was never completely wiped away.

We did all feel a lot safer after a few days, though, when the press leaked the story that an Olympic Park security guard was the prime suspect. Of course, that sense of security was based on a falsehood, since it turned out that Richard Jewell was innocent. Unfortunately for him, he wan't publicly cleared until October, and he has never really recovered from the accusations — yet another victim of the Olympic bombing.

The real culprit was an American anti-abortion terrorist named Eric Rudolph. Rudolph was back in the news this spring. In April he reached a plea bargain over the Olympic bomb and three others, escaping the death penalty as a reward for his confession. He's now serving four consecutive life sentences, without possibility of parole.

Now Eric Rudolph may be evil, but he is certainly no genius, as you can quickly see if you read his manifesto. The description of events leading up to the Olympic bombing is particularly infuriating. This self-described "warrior" was too cowardly to provide the necessary warning to the authorities. Innocent bystanders were killed or injured because of his weakness and lack of planning, not because of any intelligence on his part. (As a side effect of this cowardice, he also failed to propagate his hateful message, thereby rendering the attack completely pointless even in his own deranged value system.)

Prior to Eric Rudolph's botched but deadly attempt at disrupting the 1996 games, there had been only one other serious terrorist attack at the Olympics: the kidnapping and murder of 11 Israelis by the Palestinian group Black September on September 5 and 6, 1972. Alexander Wolff's Time article "When the Terror Began" (quoted and linked above) gives a gripping account of the attack, and a fascinating historical look at the security preparations that surround the Olympic games.

Like Rudolph's 1996 attack, the 1972 attack was not really directed at the Olympic games. Although it is clear in both cases that the terrorists had little sympathy for the Olympic movement, the games served mainly to heighten worldwide publicity about the attacks. Unlike Rudolph's half-baked paranoid delusion, however, the Black September operation was fully planned and rehearsed, well financed, and executed by suicidal fanatics. In the end, there were no survivors. All eleven Israeli athletes and coaches were killed, along with all five of the terrorists and one German police officer. (Israel later hunted down eleven more terrorists in retaliation, an operation which will be the subject of Steven Spielberg's next movie.) The 1972 attack was the deadliest act of Olympic terrorism ever.

Or was it? What about the recent events in London? The deadly train and bus bombings of July 7, which killed 52 people and injured more than 700, were set off the morning after London won the right to host the 2012 Olympics. Most commentators are playing that down as a coincidence, speculating that the bombings were actually linked to the G8 summit starting in Scotland that day. Sean at sportsBabel presents an alternative possibility, however:

Is it not at least possible that this is related to London winning the rights to host the 2012 Olympics? That terrorist cells were poised in each of the five finalist cities, each ready to detonate the opening volley in the second battle of what Baudrillard considers to be World War 4? Each ready to deliver this semiotic payload: You are not safe here … We are coming after the globalized Olympic spectacle … Sponsors be warned. That London was ultimately successful in winning the bid … while all eyes were on Geldof and the G8ers rocking the free world not far down the road, is sheer providence for the terrorists in this hypothetical scenario, since the televisual politics has everyone looking in the wrong direction for the "reason" why.

Could this be true? And if so, are we going to see more and more attacks directed at the Olympics? Are we seeing that already? A few weeks before the IOC decision, the Basque separatist group Eta set off a bomb of their own at one of the proposed Olympic venues in Madrid. In Greece, there have been three bombs in the last eight months, specifically targeting construction companies that profited from the 2004 Olympics.

If this is more than a coincidence, then we are seeing a new and frightening development: attacks that are are primarily directed at damaging the Olympic games. Are the Olympic games becoming a new front in this growing war?

Olympic Host Voting Analysis

So everybody knows by now that London is going to be the host of the 2012 summer Olympics. I don't know if you happened to catch the broadcast of the voting, with Jacques Rogge opening the final envelope with trembling hands … such drama! The IOC sure knows how to put on a show.

London edged out Paris on the fourth ballot, which was a mild upset according to the experts. I don't know how the experts came up with their predictions, since there isn't much to base them on, but that was the general consensus. Eight months ago I made my own prediction, which was rather vague about the actual winner, but got the rest exactly right:

Moscow has got to be considered the longest shot here … New York seems to have two fairly significant political problems … That leaves one of the big three EU capitals. The winner will be the group that can win votes from outside of Europe.

The result was met with joy, despair, and excuse-making, which just proves that human beings really, really want to win any prize that they have to compete for, regardless of its value.

(For the second time in a week, I'll put in a plug for King Kaufman at Salon.com, who treated the whole thing with the appropriate amount of gravity — which is to say, very little.)

It's slightly amusing to look at what actually happened to the delegate votes through the different rounds. In case you aren't aware, the host city voting is conducted in multiple rounds until one candidate receives a majority of the votes. If no candidate receives a majority, then the lowest-scoring candidate is eliminated and the vote is repeated. Also, delegates from countries with candidate cities can't vote until their cities are eliminated.

Figure 1

Figure 1 — 2012 summer Olympic host city voting by round (click to enlarge).

Figure 1 (inset right) shows what happened in this very close vote.

In the first round, the votes were split quite evenly, with Moscow (as expected) coming up a little bit short.

The New York delegation was probably hoping that some regional politics would come into play here. The logic would go something like this: the delegates who wanted an Olympics in Moscow would recognize that a 2012 win for a European city would shut that continent out until at least 2020. Therefore, they would throw their support behind New York, leaving Moscow as an option for 2016. Supporters of each European capital, as their city was eliminated, would use the same logic, and voilà — victory for New York.

But it's a far-fetched theory. Who, other than the Russians, feels that strongly about an Olympics in Moscow?

At any rate, the plan failed spectacularly. In the second round, there were 15 delegates who voted for Moscow, plus the three Russian delegates, who were "free agents." There's no evidence that any of them voted for New York; in fact, at least three of the delegates who voted for New York in the first round abandoned them in the second! Perhaps they had voted for New York the first time just as a nice gesture. If we assume that there were three switchers, that makes 18 votes to be redistributed; 12 of them went to Madrid, with the rest split 5-4 London-Paris. At the end of two rounds, Madrid was the surprising leader.

In the third round, the 16 New York voters plus the 3 USA delegates came into play. At least one voter also abandoned Madrid, for no apparent reason. This was where London got its big break. Of the 20 free voters, London took 12, and Paris took the other 8. My suspicion is that the second-round New York and Madrid votes went 9-8 London-Paris in the third round, and the USA delegates all went to London.

That decisive edge was all London needed; when Madrid was eliminated, its 31 supporters and the Spanish delegate were evenly split between Paris and London; a slight (17-15) edge to Paris, actually, but not enough to take the lead.

If my theory is correct (and I can't prove it) then the three USA delegates held the balance of power here; had they switched from London to Paris, the outcome would have been reversed. At any rate it is clear that there was only one block of delegates that significantly favoured London over Paris, and that's the group of voters that supported New York.

Hmmm, do you think that world politics came into play at all?